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STANDING UP TO LEGISLATIVE BULLIES:
SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATE COURTS,
AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
SONJA RALSTON ELDER†
ABSTRACT
The separation of powers doctrine creates a strong presumption in
favor of judicial deference to legislative policy determinations. This
doctrine was developed for federal courts, however, and does not
apply with identical force to state courts enforcing state constitutional
rights. This Note examines rationales for the separation of powers
doctrine and their potential application to state courts. After
concluding that deference should be more limited in state courts, it
then applies this conclusion to educational rights, which are
frequently at risk due to political market failures. By examining case
studies of constitutionally based education litigation in seven states,
this Note concludes with recommendations to state courts facing the
challenge of managing such cases: issue a strong first opinion,
maintain jurisdiction by remanding the case rather than finalizing it,
and demonstrate an upfront commitment to enforcing educational
rights.

INTRODUCTION
In 1973 in San Antonio Independent School District v.
1
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court of the United States held that there is
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1. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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2
no federal constitutional right to education. In the wake of
Rodriguez, school districts and civil rights groups around the country
began to file suits in state courts under state constitutional
3
provisions. These suits challenged state funding structures that
disadvantaged racial and economic minorities, and they fell along two
lines of argument: disparate funding between districts violated the
state’s equal protection guarantees (equity claims), or the funding
system prohibited students in low-wealth districts from receiving an
adequate education as required by the education clause of the state
constitution (adequacy claims).4 Between 1973 and 2007, there were
eleven successful equity claims and twenty successful adequacy claims
covering twenty-six states.5
Even several decades after Rodriguez, however, family education
and income levels remained the best predictors of a child’s future
academic success.6 Nationwide, minority students were only two-

2. Id. at 35.
3. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 220
n.4 (1990). These suits followed the sage advice of Justice William Brennan that “[s]tate
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
For a catalog of such provisions, see Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992).
4. See Thro, supra note 3, at 222, 225, 233 (explaining that Rodriguez and other claims
based on the federal constitution made up the first wave of litigation, the second wave was
equity suits based on state constitutions, and the third wave consists of adequacy suits based on
state constitutions). But see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints:
A Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (noting that “courts have fused their equity and
adequacy analyses” and that it is often difficult to distinguish second and third wave cases
effectively).
5. Sonja Ralston Elder, School Financing Lawsuits: The Way out of the Fog or Just
Blowing Smoke?, 3 EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., 5 tbl.1 (2007), http://www.educationlawconsortium.
org/forum/2007/papers/Ralston2007.pdf. States with successful equity rulings (“equity states”)
include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. States with successful adequacy rulings
(“adequacy states”) include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id.
6. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP
(2004) (documenting the variety of pervasive differences between the classes that explains much
of the discrepancy between lower-class and middle-class average student scores).
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thirds as likely to graduate from high school as white students.
Students who do not learn to read well are significantly more likely to
be unemployed, incarcerated, and poor.8 A quality education is
critical for all children, yet not all children have the opportunity to
receive that education.
As the persistence of dramatic inequities demonstrates, not all
courtroom victories have become classroom successes; indeed, in
some states, very little has changed. For example, in Ohio, ten years
9
after the first Ohio Supreme Court decision, the state’s system of
education financing remained unconstitutional,10 and the Ohio
Supreme Court decided that its involvement in the matter was
11
finished. In many cases, state courts are reluctant to “usurp”
policymaking power from the legislature, and in their respect for the
idea of separation of powers,12 they leave class after class of
schoolchildren without the announced, basic constitutional right to an
13
adequate education.
This Note advocates that state courts intervene more actively to
remedy violations of individuals’ state constitutional rights when
legislatures have been recalcitrant. In these circumstances, the courts
are justified in taking action because arguments advocating judicial
restraint for Article III courts do not apply wholesale to state courts.
Although this Note focuses on the education clauses of state

7. See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY YOUTH ARE
BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 2 (2004), available at http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/410936_LosingOurFuture.pdf (observing that in 2001 only 50 percent
of black students, 51 percent of Native American students, and 53 percent of Hispanic students
graduated from high school, whereas 75 percent of white students graduated).
8. Nat’l Inst. for Literacy, Facts & Statistics, http://www.nifl.gov/nifl/facts/workforce.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
9. The Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the state’s education system in DeRolph v.
State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
10. The Ohio Supreme Court has never recanted its original determination that the state’s
financing system is unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 127–41.
11. See State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) (“The
duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy an educational system that has been
found . . . to still be unconstitutional.”); see also Christen Spears Hignett, Comment, Ohio’s
Public School Funding System: The Unanswered Questions and the Unresolved Problems of
DeRolph, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 739, 739–40 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio . . . ruled
that . . . the courts of Ohio could no longer exercise any jurisdiction in this case.”).
12. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006)
(“[W]e must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of government.”).
13. See Hignett, supra note 11, at 740 (explaining how “legislative inaction and judicial
reluctance and restraint” in the Ohio cases have left the students virtually “without redress”).
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constitutions, the analysis regarding the role of and limits on the state
courts’ powers could apply to any state constitutional violation. Part I
examines the separation of powers doctrine and argues that it should
not be interpreted as stringently in state courts as it is in the federal
courts. Part II explains how the separation of powers issue applies to
educational rights in particular. Then, to better understand the ideal
path for educational rights cases, Part III presents case studies of
successes in Kentucky and Massachusetts, where the system
functioned as designed and each branch upheld its end of the
separation of powers bargain. Finally, Part IV examines three
alternative court reactions to legislative inaction through the school
financing experiences in Ohio and New Jersey, in New York and
North Carolina, and in Nevada, with the latter three states providing
models for how state courts can overcome reluctant legislatures and
uphold students’ educational rights.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The idea of separation of powers has always been an integral
part of the federal government and national constitution.14 It plays a
central role in the United States’ unique experiment with democracy
as it serves to “implement a fundamental insight: concentration of
power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”15 At the
federal level, it is generally accepted that there are solid distinctions
16
between the powers of each branch. Based on these structural
features, the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal courts
should generally defer to the legislative and executive branches
regarding policymaking.17 Even at the federal level, however, judicial
deference has its limits because the very purpose of the judiciary is to
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (“The principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted . . . .”).
15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy goes on to quote the Federalist Papers’ statement that “[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
16. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124 (emphasizing that separation of powers is not “an
abstract generalization”). The text of the Constitution also suggests such distinctions. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative [p]owers” in Congress (emphasis added)).
17. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (finding that the determination of the
“general welfare” for purposes of the Spending Clause requires discretion, which is vested in
Congress and not the courts).
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uphold the people’s constitutional rights and to provide a check on
18
the power of the other branches. Separation of powers is therefore a
good starting point for the courts, but by no means absolute.
In Rodriguez,19 the Supreme Court explained that “the Justices of
this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to
the raising and disposition of public revenues.”20 Concluding that the
problems of funding and implementing education are complex, the
Court decided that the legislature’s judgments were “entitled to
respect.”21 Judicial deference based on the separation of powers
doctrine continues to rule in federal courts, but deference should not
be an end in itself, only a means of enforcing the structural balance of
power established by the Constitution. If the underlying structural
reasons for deferring are absent in a particular case, deference should
not be mandated. In the federal system, separation of powers
arguments for deference of Article III courts are rooted in three key
structural aspects of the Constitution: (1) the federal constitution that
federal courts uphold is primarily one of negative rights,22 (2) the
federal government is one of limited powers,23 and (3) the federal
courts are beyond popular review.24 A fourth and more practical

18. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 870 (1960) (“[T]he judiciary
was made independent because it has . . . the primary responsibility and duty of giving force and
effect to constitutional liberties and limitations upon the executive and legislative branches.”);
see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”).
19. This Note does not address the propriety of Rodriguez. Until it is overruled, however,
future efforts to ensure educational rights must work within its framework.
20. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973).
21. Id. at 42.
22. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(upholding against constitutional challenge a state’s inaction because “nothing in the language
of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors”). Although DeShaney deals with action by a state
government, it interprets the federal Constitution. Id. at 191.
23. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1143–45 (1996) (discussing the limits on
the powers of the federal government imposed by the Tenth Amendment and Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1).
24. Concern about unelected judges overriding the determinations of legislative majorities
is perhaps the most frequently given reason for the need for judicial restraint. See, e.g.,
Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 635 (2005) (“The existence
of judicial review . . . poses the countermajoritarian danger that unelected judges, who are
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reason is also sometimes cited by the courts as a rationale for
deference: they consider the federal courts largely incompetent in
25
making policy. Each of these four issues does not apply in the same
26
way to state courts. This Part explores these rationales and their
application to state courts in turn.
A. State Constitutions Provide Positive Rights
First and most importantly, state courts enforce state
constitutions that are substantively different from the federal
constitution. As the Supreme Court envisions it, the federal
constitution is one of negative rights27—rights that prevent the
government from doing something to people, like unreasonably
28
searching their homes and that cannot be violated by government
inaction. In contrast, all state constitutions contain at least some
29
positive rights —rights that entitle people to some benefit or action

intentionally insulated from political accountability will . . . trump the policy preferences of the
representative branches of government.”).
25. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41 (reiterating that the Justices “lack . . . the expertise” to
tackle certain problems).
26. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977) (noting
that federal and state courts are not the same and that it is dangerous to assume that they are);
see also Amanda S. Hawthorne, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, The Opportunity in
Adequacy Litigation: Recognizing the Legitimacy and Value of Pursuing Educational Reform
through the Courts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 761, 762 (2005) (“Educational reform through the courts is
justified given the inherent flexibility of the separation of powers doctrine at the state
level . . . .”).
It is important to remember that there are fifty state constitutions, all different, that all
provide for a different balance of power between the state’s branches of government.
Therefore, each of these issues (particularly the first two) varies a great deal in how strongly it
applies to a given state. In a broader sense, this section is an argument against federal bias in
state courts: one should not assume that all state courts operate by the same rules or principles
that the federal courts do.
27. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause
itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (summarizing Supreme Court precedent from Harris v. McRae, 488
U.S. 297 (1980), Judge Posner commented that “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather
than positive liberties”); see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (explaining that Judge Posner’s characterization “finds support
in the constitutional language, in Supreme Court decisions, and in the history of the Bill of
Rights as a safeguard against governmental intrusion”).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (“Unlike the Federal Constitution,
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30
from the state government; the right to education is a quintessential
example of a positive right. By including these positive rights, state
constitutions “explicitly engage state courts in substantive areas that
31
have historically been outside the Article III domain.”
With positive rights, the courts have to be more involved because
32
it is more difficult to “ensure that the government is doing its job”
33
than it is to prohibit certain behaviors. As Professor Helen
Hershkoff puts it, “[t]he enforcement of positive rights thus requires a
state court to share explicitly in public governance, engaging in the
principled dialogue that commentators traditionally associate with the
common law resolution of social and economic issues.”34 An
appropriate application of the separation of powers doctrine to
positive rights would “recognize that legislative action satisfying a
constitutional obligation is extremely unlikely unless judicial rulings
35
call for such action.” In the absence of the judicial requirement to
provide the right and judicial threat to act in the stead of a
recalcitrant legislature, legislative actors have little incentive to spend
money raised in their own districts on constituents in other districts
because there is no electoral return for the political risk.36 Judicial
threats are a common means of enforcing constitutional rights; for
example, Article III courts threaten through the exclusionary rule to
suppress evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment.37

every state constitution in the United States addresses social and economic concerns, and
provides the basis for a variety of positive claims against the government.”).
30. Id. at 1138 (“[P]ositive rights not only restrain the government’s exercise of power, but
also compel its exercise, constraining the government to use its assigned authority to carry out a
specified constitutional purpose.”).
31. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1890 (2001).
32. See Hershkoff, supra note 29, at 1138.
33. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1890–91 (“[I]f negative rights under the federal
Constitution restrain government action, positive rights under state constitutions mandate such
action.” (citation omitted)). Additionally, more judicial involvement is warranted because these
provisions of state constitutions are more complex than the prohibitions in the federal
Constitution and need more interpretation and enforcement. Id.
34. Hershkoff, supra note 29, at 1138.
35. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims:
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1089 (1993).
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (explaining that the rule’s “purpose is
to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”).
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Because state courts are charged with enforcing a different type of
constitutional right, different types of judicial threats are appropriate.
B. State Governments Are Not As Limited As the Federal
Government
One reason frequently given for the need for restraint and
deference from the federal courts is that the federal government as a
38
whole is one of limited powers. Article III courts were established in
direct rejection of the English common law system of courts in which
final appeal rested with the House of Lords, which frequently mixed
policymaking with judicial determinations.39 On the other hand, states
are sovereigns with legislative and judicial powers broader than those
40
of the federal government, and state courts have inherent powers as
well as statutorily granted ones.41
Article III courts are also subjected to substantial limits on their
powers through the Constitution’s jurisdictional restraints.42 Many
43
state courts are not similarly restricted. Moreover, nearly all state
courts are common law courts, directly engaged in crafting the law as
well as applying it.44 Common law jurisprudence is inherently a
policymaking enterprise because the process of selecting a legal test

38. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1888; see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608
(2000) (“Congress’ . . . authority is not without effective bounds.”).
39. Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 TUL. L. REV.
75, 103–04 (1995) (noting that in 1787 “no court in England or any American state” had final
appellate authority and that many state legislatures “retained the authority to review judicial
decisions”). After the ratification of the federal constitution, many states moved away from the
English model and established separate judiciaries, but they did so in a variety of manners and
at different times. See id. at 104–05 (“At the time of the convention, many state appellate courts,
such as those of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, provided entirely new trials
for appellants. In other states, such as the Carolinas, trial-court judges met together to consider
appeals.”).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers “not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution” to the states).
41. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1888–89 (“[T]he concept of inherent authority provides a
legitimating wedge for state judicial activity even when the constitution or statutory scheme
does not explicitly grant jurisdiction.”).
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
43. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1845–46.
44. Id. at 1889 (explaining that the common law system inherently involves “state courts in
social and economic policymaking”). Although the historical traditions of Louisiana law are
rooted in the Napoleonic Code rather than English common law, Louisiana’s public law and
court systems are and have always been based on the common law model. Mary Garvey Algero,
The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil
Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 777 (2005).
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for tort liability or good faith dealing, for example, rests in large part
on what values the court decides to uphold and then on how such
45
values can be promoted through rules, tests, and doctrines. It is
therefore not out of place for state courts to engage in the
policymaking decisions necessary to enforce and uphold
constitutional rights.
C. State Judges Are Not beyond Popular Review
Another oft-cited reason for judicial restraint at the federal level
is that the federal judiciary is beyond popular control: judges are
appointed by the executive for life terms.46 In such a system, there is
legitimate concern for those worried about a loss of democratic
control if judges insert themselves too much into policymaking,
which, by design, is to be carried out by the popularly elected
branches of government. Thirty-eight states, however, engage in some
form of judicial elections.47 Eleven of the remaining twelve states
usually appoint judges for terms that are renewable by the state
48
legislature; only Rhode Island appoints judges for life. Although the
merits of judicial elections are debatable, the fact that nearly all state
court judges are elected or subject to review by elected officials
means that criticisms of so-called judicial activism based on life tenure
are largely inapplicable to state courts.

45. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1889 (“The common law’s continuing vitality, involving
state courts in social and economic policymaking, effectively ‘blur[s] the lines of separation of
powers within and among state institutions.’” (quoting Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins,
Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999)) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
46. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 16
(1983) (“What can fairly be inferred from the constitutional scheme [of life appointment in
Article III] is that the judges are not to exercise the same free-wheeling legislative discretion as
the elected representatives . . . .”).
47. JAN WITOLD BARAN, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION/ELECTION 1 (2006). There
are two main types of judicial elections. In the first type of system, judges run for their bench
seats in the same way legislators run for their statehouse ones. In the second, judges are
appointed by the executive or by the legislature and periodically run unopposed in retention
elections. Any judge who is not reelected is replaced by a new appointment. Id.
48. Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (surveying information about each state’s judiciary). Interestingly,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has ruled that education adequacy is a nonjusticiable political
question. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) (“Because we believe the
proper forum for this deliberation is the General Assembly, not the courtroom, we decline to
endorse the trial justice’s plan . . . .”).
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D. State Courts Are Competent Policymakers
Finally, there is concern about the policymaking competence of
Article III courts. These concerns come in two varieties: federalist
and interbranch. The federalist concern, as the Supreme Court put it
in Rodriguez, says that a key reason the federal courts should stay out
of local policy issues like education is their incompetence regarding
the policymaking that school funding inevitably requires.49 There is
little question that crafting a constitutional school funding system,
like the remedial phase of much public law litigation, is “essentially
part of a process of policy design and implementation.”50 Yet that
does not necessarily mean that courts should stay out; courts
routinely deal with complex and controversial issues. In their
continued struggle to desegregate American schools, even the federal
courts made use of some unusual tools, such as special masters, that
substantially improved the courts’ competence in designing
remedies.51 Additionally, state courts have smaller jurisdictions and
closer ties to the community, so their competence in crafting
appropriate remedies in positive rights cases is arguably much greater
than that of their federal counterparts.52
The interbranch concern pertains to the comparative
competence of the branches; most state constitutions “do not reflect
the same level of trust in state legislative decisionmaking as does the
53
federal Constitution in congressional decisionmaking.” This lack of
trust is eminently reasonable. Some states have only part-time
legislatures54 or ones that only meet biennially.55 Even in those states
where serving as a representative is a full-time job, legislatures are

49. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973).
50. Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance,
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV.
281, 310 (1998).
51. Id.
52. See id. (“Complex issues are nothing new to the judiciary.”).
53. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1892–93.
54. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Backgrounder: Full- and Part-Time
Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2004/backgrounder_fullandpart.htm
(last
visited Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that there are seventeen legislatures that can be considered
part-time in which legislators are only paid an average of about $16,000 and average just over
one staff person per legislator).
55. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Session History, http://www.ncsl.org/Programs/
legismgt/about/sesshistory.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
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56
often understaffed and rarely have the time to fully research
national trends or best practices. Many states have constitutional
provisions limiting the actions of the legislature such as bans on
special legislation, which were enacted to combat legislative abuses
and corruption.57 In sum, unlike the situation between Congress and
the Article III courts, many state legislatures do not possess an
institutional competency greater than that of their state courts;
therefore, interbranch concerns about competence do not apply to
the state courts in the same blanket way they are applied to the
federal courts, and federalist concerns are, by definition, inapplicable
to state courts dealing with state issues.

*

*

*

For the Article III courts, the Constitution may require a stricter
separation of powers, but this doctrine should not be applied
wholesale to state courts without considering the reasoning behind it.
State courts, unlike Article III courts, enforce positive rights, are not
courts of limited powers, are generally democratically accountable,
and are more competent than federal courts relative to their
legislative counterparts in overseeing policy implementation.
This broader view of the separation of powers doctrine at the
state level means that state courts should see themselves as
empowered and obligated to be as involved as is necessary to ensure
that all students are receiving a constitutionally adequate education.
II. “DEFERENCE, HOWEVER, HAS ITS LIMITS.”58
At the state court level, there is widespread agreement that
judicial deference reaches its limits when the other branches of
government enact policies that violate people’s constitutional rights
or, conversely, fail to enact policies needed to protect those rights.
Section A demonstrates such agreement in school financing and
educational adequacy cases, and Section B examines why it is justified
under public choice theory.

56. See generally Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Staff Trends in the 50 State
Legislatures: 1979, 1988, 1996, 2003, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/staffchg.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (showing a decline in the total number of staff in state legislatures
between 1996 and 2003, which suggests possible understaffing).
57. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1894.
58. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006).
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A. The Infringement of Constitutional Rights is the Limit of
Deference
It is precisely because each branch of government is charged with
different duties that the courts’ deference to the legislative and
executive branches must have limits: without such limits, the courts
could not fulfill their function as the ultimate protector of the
people’s rights.59 Education adequacy cases are some of the most
political, policy-heavy issues dealt with by state courts. Yet
throughout the canons of education adequacy law, courts have found
that judicial deference is limited, even when they have refused to act
on such findings.60 For example, the abundantly cautious New Jersey
Supreme Court stated in 1997, after more than twenty years of
deferential judicial involvement in the state’s education financing
policy,61 that a judicial remedy was finally needed to “vindicate the
constitutional rights of the school children in the poverty-stricken
62
urban districts.” As the New Jersey court suggested, the limits of
judicial deference are reached when the other branches of
government fail (sometimes repeatedly) to remedy unconstitutional
situations that violate people’s rights.63 In education adequacy cases,

59. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975) (calling the
courts “the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution’s command”).
60. See, e.g., Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 1003 (Galway, J., concurring
specially in part and dissenting in part) (“While it is appropriate to give due deference to a coequal branch of government as long as it is functioning within constitutional constraints, it
would be a serious dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional
violation.” (quoting Baines v. N.H. Senate President, 876 A.2d 768, 775 (N.H. 2005))). The New
Hampshire court ultimately refused to supply meaning to the state’s right to education because
it continued to see that task as one for the legislature. Id. at 996 (majority opinion).
61. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997) (noting that “one must
evaluate an alternative, ‘wait and see’ approach,” but, given “the persistence and depth of the
constitutional deprivation, and in the absence of any real prospect for genuine educational
improvement in the most needy districts, that approach is no longer an option”).
62. Id.; see also Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 996 (“[T]he judiciary has a
responsibility to ensure that constitutional rights not be hollowed out and, in the absence of
action by other branches, a judicial remedy is not only appropriate but essential.”); Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 62 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“Having failed to satisfy their responsibility, defendants now
compel this Court to determine the specific steps that must be taken to remedy the undisputed
constitutional violation.”); James C. Sheil, Note, The Just-Do-It Decision: School-Funding
Litigation Tests the Limits of Judicial Deference, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 620, 647 (1997)
(“When a governmental body fails to meet its constitutional obligations, the courts are not only
empowered, but are obligated to act.”).
63. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 724 (noting that “there comes a time when no alternative [to
judicial action] remains”); see also Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to
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courts should begin their enforcement of students’ rights with
deference to and trust in the coequal branches of government, but
they should always be on the lookout for evidence that “[their] trust
64
was misplaced” and a more active remedy has become necessary.
In fact, many courts recognize that the limits to their deference
are not discretionary. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a
court “must use power equal to its responsibility” as the last-resort
65
protector of the people’s rights. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has required that when the other branches fail to act, “a
66
judicial remedy is not only appropriate but essential.” The chief
judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye, proclaimed
that when the state failed to bring the school funding statute into
constitutional compliance, the court was “compel[led]” to act in its
stead.67 The Wyoming Supreme Court found that the scope of its
“duty to protect individual rights include[d] compelling legislative
68
action.” The Arkansas Supreme Court also found that it had a
“duty . . . to assure constitutional compliance” when it gave the
legislature less than a year to fix its failing education system or have
the solution mandated by the court.69 The list goes on. Although these
limits apply to all state constitutional cases, they are reached
frequently in cases regarding educational rights because such rights
are positive in nature and can be infringed by legislative inaction.
Indeed, when enforcing negative rights, deference to the
legislature is more easily justified because the court’s action in
striking down the offending law ends the constitutional violation; no
further legislative action is needed to remedy the situation. With
positive rights, on the other hand, the legislature’s inaction is the very
source of the constitutional violation and deference allows that

an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 142 (“A court should be constrained by the
limitations of its role. It should not, however, abandon its duty to determine whether the
legislature has complied with the State’s constitution.”); Sheil, supra note 62, at 631–32
(explaining that the court’s remedy in Abbott IV was based on its reasoning “that the court’s
role as the ultimate protector of constitutional rights demanded action” despite its respect for
the separation of powers doctrine).
64. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 62 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 724.
66. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 996.
67. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 62 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995).
69. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 220 S.W.3d 645, 657 (Ark. 2005).
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70
violation to persist. Thus judicial deference should be most limited
in cases that concern positive rights.

B. Educational Rights in Peril
The sheer volume of educational rights lawsuits attests to the fact
that the positive right to education is often underprovided. A marketbased model like public choice theory is apropos to the problems
surrounding the provision of educational rights, because it provides
an explanation for why legislatures have so frequently failed to
adequately fund the education of impoverished children. Public
choice theory explains that one can conceive of democratic
institutions, such as legislatures, as a type of political market.71 In the
political market, politicians act to maximize their chances for
reelection, and one gains election by accumulating more votes
(political capital) than one’s opponent.72 To maximize efficiency, the
politician will seek capital with a low marginal cost, from interest
groups who control large numbers of votes and are easy to please.73
When they function properly and there are no externalities such as
disenfranchisement, political markets, like economic markets, provide
an efficient allocation of resources.74 Like economic markets,
75
however, political markets can fail. Such failures are most likely to
occur, almost by definition, when the rights of the powerless are at
stake because the majority is making the laws. When there is a
political market failure in the legislative branch, the courts can

70. In the segregation context, several lower courts treated states’ violations of the separate
but equal requirement as violation of a positive right—the right to equal facilities provided by
the state—and accordingly refused to defer to the legislature for a remedy. In ordering
Delaware’s schools integrated, Chancellor Seitz rejected deference to the legislature as
equivalent to telling the plaintiff, “Yes, your Constitutional rights are being invaded, but be
patient, we will see whether in time they are still being violated.” Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d
862, 870 (Del. Ch. 1952), aff’d, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
71. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
72. Id.
73. See id. (“The politician will accept campaign contributions from interest groups until
the marginal cost in votes of taking another contribution is equal to the contribution’s marginal
benefit.”).
74. See id. at 14–16 (explaining that inegalitarian distribution of political capital, common
in the modern system of campaign finance, creates a Kaldor-Hicks inefficient allocation of
resources).
75. Id.
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frequently step in and “jump-start” the process by declaring that
76
someone’s rights have been violated.
Public school financing is particularly susceptible to political
market failure because children cannot vote, children in low-income
families are especially underrepresented in statehouses, and voters
generally resist attempts to send locally raised revenues to other
localities. First, the right to education is uniquely vulnerable to
majoritarian attack because very few of the right holders are
77
members of the electorate. Given that children cannot vote, they
must rely on others to value a quality education on their behalf either
out of altruism or because they see some personal benefit in so doing,
like reducing their need for private child care, improving the
economy, or stabilizing their own retirement by preparing future
workers.78 Long-term investments, however, are notoriously difficult
79
in political bodies because they involve short-term sacrifices. This
differential could also be explained as a time-based, or “vertical,”
political externality because “[present] constituents obtain benefits at
the expense of other [future] constituents.”80 Here, the present voters
gain lower taxes at the expense of educating future voters.
A second reason the right to education is unusually predisposed
to political market failure is that the children for whom the right
81
matters the most, at-risk students, are concentrated in a few

76. Heise, supra note 50, at 306.
77. Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for Children’s
Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1956 (1993) (“Investing in children’s human capital on a payas-you-go basis requires present voters to sacrifice in order to increase the returns enjoyed by a
future generation. Unfortunately, that future generation lacks voting power at the time the
decision to invest must be made.”).
78. Id. at 1957.
79. Id. at 1956.
80. Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 109 (2006) (explaining that vertical externalities occur when
there are time differences between paying and receiving constituents). Politicians are unwilling
to invest in disaster prevention programs whose benefit will accrue to future generations and
thus future politicians but they are very willing to overspend on disaster response in the present
term. Id. at 104. In the same sense, politicians are willing to spend billions to incarcerate
undereducated people in the present but are unwilling to spend a fraction of that on improving
public education for low-income children to prevent future crime.
81. Although many factors influence a student’s risk for academic difficulties, living in
poverty is the most commonly used indicator. See, e.g., KAN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., AT-RISK
DEFINITION 1, available at http://www3.ksde.org/leaf/survey_on_education_costs/at-risk.pdf
(“Kansas statutes define at-risk as the number of students eligible for free lunches.”). In
addition to living in a low-income household, living with only one parent or with someone other
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82
legislative districts and command fewer votes per child than their
83
non-at-risk peers. For example, in a low-income area, single-parent
families are more common.84
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau help quantify the differences.
In 2005, an average single-earner household had roughly $30,000 in
income and contained 2.3 people.85 Recognizing that a substantial
number of those households were single adults, those low-income
households that contain children would contain more people than the
average: it is reasonable to say the ratio of voters to children in a
lower-income household is roughly one voter to 1.3 children. In
contrast, an average dual-earner household earned around $80,000
and contained three people.86 Because a dual-earner household
almost invariably requires two adults, the ratio in that case is closer to
two voters to one child. Therefore, approximately 2.6 times as many
votes represent each non-at-risk child as do each at-risk child.87 This
analysis is necessarily imperfect because the data are only available in

than a parent, having poorly educated parents, and being a non-native English speaker are risk
factors.
82. In the past three decades, poverty has become increasingly concentrated in inner cities
as “high-poverty ghettos and barrios” have expanded rapidly. Paul A. Jargowsky, Sprawl,
Concentration of Poverty, and Urban Inequality, in URBAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND POLICY RESPONSES 39, 42 (Gregory Squires ed., 2002).
83. As a general matter, wealthier people have fewer children. Now We Are 300,000,000,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2006, at 29, 29; see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN
WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at 4 (2005) (showing that women in the $20,000–$34,999 annual family
income bracket have 18 percent more children than do women in the $100,000 and above
bracket); Robert L. Brown, Baby Boom and Baby Bust: Fertility Rates and Why They Vary,
CONTINGENCIES, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 17, 18 (explaining that the more educated a woman is, the
fewer children she has because the opportunity cost of having children is higher).
84. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, RATE OF CHILDREN IN LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES VARIES WIDELY BY STATE 2 (2004) (“Single-parent families are more than twice as
likely to be low-income as two-parent families.”); see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILDREN’S
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 14 (2003) (showing that
although more than half of children in families below the poverty line live with only one parent,
only about 7 percent of children in families earning more than $75,000 annually do).
85. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement, Selected Characteristics of Households by Total Money Income in 2005, available
at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/hhinc/new01_001.htm.
86. Id.
87. The high income ratio of 2:1 reduces to 2. The low income ratio of 1:1.3 reduces to 0.77.
To compare the two ratios, divide the first by the second: 2/0.77 = 2.6. Certainly, not all nonearners are children and not all voters are wage-earners, but almost equally certainly, and
despite some minors in the workforce, nearly all wage-earners are eligible to vote and nearly all
children are non-earners. Other evidence also corroborates the assumptions that underlie this
methodology. See supra notes 81–84.
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aggregated form. In its rough sketches, however, it demonstrates a
discrepancy in the political voice of children from different
backgrounds. This imbalance is further exacerbated by the fact that
88
eligible voters in low-income areas are less likely to vote in general.
With that kind of imbalance, it is not surprising that at-risk children
face an uphill battle in the legislature for adequate funding for their
schools.
Third, school funding decisions are susceptible to legislature
capture. Professor Clayton Gillette provides an excellent depiction of
how this process applies to school funding decisions:
[P]ublic choice theory tells us that the very fact that local
representatives are making these decisions will frustrate reform
efforts. . . . [S]tate legislators from wealthy areas will be reluctant to
engage in substantial redistribution of local school dollars. Even
well-meaning legislators will fear electoral redress should they spend
local dollars on non-local functions. One can readily appreciate the
dilemma of the state legislator who agrees that some redistribution
is appropriate, but who fears informing constituents that he or she
89
has voted to send their tax dollars to a neighboring locality.

This is an example of a horizontal political externality90 because the
benefits would accrue to people in the poorer areas who could not
vote for the representatives from the wealthier areas whose support
would be needed to pass the law—there is no electoral payoff to the
suburban legislator for supporting improvement of the urban schools.
Taken together, these factors counsel courts to limit their
deference to the legislature when adjudicating cases regarding school
financing in particular, and educational adequacy in general. For the
reasons discussed in this Part, the political branches are often
unwilling to uphold educational rights, and this “political
voicelessness” creates a political market failure because it produces
an “inefficient underinvestment” in the education of future

88. Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Individual and Systemic Influences on Turnout:
Who Votes? 1984, J. POL., Aug. 1992, at 718, 725; see also Ian Millhiser, Note, What Happens to a
Dream Deferred: Cleansing the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
55 DUKE L.J. 405, 412 (2005) (noting that lower-educated people are less likely to vote).
89. Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary
Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 49 (1996).
90. See Depoorter, supra note 80, at 109 (noting that horizontal externalities among
different political actors occur when there are geographic, rather than temporal, differences
between paying and receiving constituents).
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91
generations. This market failure, however, could be “particularly
susceptible to judicial resolution” because judicial involvement would
provide political cover for legislators who would like to allocate
92
resources more equitably but do not for fear of electoral reprisals.
Although most state judges operate in some type of political
market, few if any are in the same type of market as legislators:
93
judicial retention elections are rarely contested, judges usually do
94
not run as members of political parties, some judges face political
95
review by the legislature or the governor rather than the voters, and
even those state high court judges who face electoral review do so on
a statewide rather than a districted basis.96 These factors, combined
97
with the overarching difference in the job description of a judge,
indicate that they are in a better position than legislators to withstand
electoral pressures on their decisions.
In addition to political cover, when courts frame issues in terms
of rights rather than policy preferences, legislators can be encouraged
to adopt a more rights-based approach to lawmaking, making fair and
just decisions rather than those that are merely self-serving in the
political marketplace.98 Unfortunately, as Part IV.A explains, some
legislators need more encouragement or cover than others, and the
market failure in those cases requires more than a jump start. In those

91. Stout, supra note 77, at 1957.
92. Gillette, supra note 89, at 49.
93. See, e.g., Iowa Judicial Branch, Judicial Retention Elections, http://www.judicial.state.
ia.us/Public_Information/About_Judges/Retention/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (“In a retention
election, judges do not have opponents.”).
94. LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL
REPORT 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_2005.pdf (noting that, of states
that elect judges, more use nonpartisan elections than partisan ones).
95. BARAN, supra note 47, at 2.
96. For example, North Carolina Supreme Court justices are elected by statewide ballot.
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
97. See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (N.Y. 2003) (“Unlike other elected officials,
however, judges do not serve particular constituencies but are sworn to apply the law
impartially to any litigant appearing before the court. Once elected to the bench, a judge’s role
is significantly different from others who take part in the political process . . . .”).
98. See Heise, supra note 50, at 306 (calling such legislative action a “veil of ignorance”
approach to lawmaking because lawmakers would pursue legislative activity without regard to
electoral concerns such as to whom rights or benefits would accrue); see also JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that the just rules for society are those that
would be chosen by one situated behind an imaginary “veil of ignorance,” who does not know
“his place in society, his class position . . . his intelligence, strength, and the like”).
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cases, the courts should see their more aggressive involvement as
99
merited—if not required—by their ultimate duty to the people.
III. WHEN THE SYSTEM WORKS
Since the early 1970s, forty-six state high courts have dealt with
100
the issue of educational rights, and it is not surprising that there
have been forty-six different outcomes, both in terms of liability and
remedy. Perhaps the greatest difference, even between states that
have had similar outcomes, is the speed with which and degree to
which the legislative and executive branches have complied with the
courts’ orders.101 The separation of powers doctrine, however,
102
assumes that each branch of government will fulfill its duties. This
Part examines situations in which that assumption was true, along
with the reaction from the courts and the impact of the litigation on
the children. It explores the experiences in Kentucky and
Massachusetts, where each branch upheld its end of the bargain: the
court defined the rights guaranteed by the state’s constitution, and
the legislature responded quickly and completely with substantial
reforms.
The drama of school finance litigation in Kentucky could hardly
have followed the separation of powers script better than it did. The
103
challenge to the state’s finance law was filed in late 1985, and the
104
Kentucky Supreme Court issued the final decision in June of 1989.

99. See Koski, supra note 4, at 1297–98 (“And if the political branches do not respond
appropriately, the judicial ‘veto power’ can again be invoked.”).
100. See Nat’l Access Network, Litigations Challenging Constitutionality of K-12 Funding in
the 50 States (2007), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/In-Process%20Litigations.pdf
(noting that Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah have never had a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of K-12 funding). Although Nevada has not had a suit
challenging its education system, its supreme court has interpreted the education clause of its
constitution to compel a remedy in a funding stalemate. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
101. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 498–99 (1999) (“In [states other than Kentucky], responses to
parallel court decrees have generally been slow, piecemeal, and seldom in compliance with the
constitutional mandate on the first attempt.”).
102. See Heise, supra note 50, at 326 (“[E]ach branch necessarily relies on the others to
fulfill its respective duties. If each governmental branch meets its obligations, conscientiously
performs its assigned roles, and respects the scope and contours of its counterparts’ roles, the
tri-partite form of government should perform as designed.”).
103. Debra H. Dawahare, Public School Reform: Kentucky’s Solution, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 27, 40 (2004).
104. Id. at 43.

05__RALSTON ELDER.DOC

774

12/20/2007 10:12:19 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:755
105

The high court’s decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education
was simultaneously sweeping and specific: it declared the entire
system of schools in Kentucky inadequate, requiring a complete re106
creation of the system, and also spelled out seven detailed areas in
which all children must acquire proficiency.107 What the court did not
do was specify how the school system should be re-created, organized,
108
or financed; it merely laid out, in no uncertain terms, what the
Kentucky Constitution required in the end. The court then gave the
General Assembly until the end of the regular legislative session in
109
1990 to solve the problem.
In contrast to nearly every other state where plaintiffs have
prevailed in a school adequacy case, the Kentucky General Assembly
110
reacted with “astonishing” speed. In just over ten months, the
Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA)111 became law.112 KERA
was indeed the complete overhaul of the education system that Rose
113
mandated and became a national model for school reform. Under
KERA, the Kentucky Department of Education was totally

105. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
106. Id. at 215.
107. Id. at 212–13. The court required
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii)
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv)
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness;
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id. at 212.
108. Id. at 214 (rejecting the state’s contention that the trial court had ordered specific
legislation enacted). The court went on:
It is clear that the specifics of the legislation will be left up to the wisdom of the
General Assembly. Clearly, no ‘legislating’ is present in the decision of the trial court,
and more importantly, as we have previously said, there is none present in the
decision of this Court.
Id.
109. Id. at 216.
110. Hunter, supra note 101, at 498–99.
111. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 156.005–168.100 (LexisNexis 2006)).
112. Dawahare, supra note 103, at 47.
113. Hunter, supra note 101, at 499.
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redesigned, an accountability system centered on performance-based
assessments was created, and a substantial minimum of per pupil
114
funding was guaranteed. In the decade that followed, “Kentucky . . .
sustained the most long-lasting, comprehensive education reforms in
115
the nation” and student achievement improved. As a testament to
the General Assembly’s embrace of its role in remedying the
constitutional inadequacies of the Kentucky schools, there have been
no further proceedings regarding Rose.
A similar situation unfolded in Massachusetts, where the 1993
116
case McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education found
that state’s education system constitutionally inadequate.117 In
articulating the breadth of the state’s constitutional obligation, the
Massachusetts court quoted directly from Rose the seven capacities
that children must develop in school.118 The McDuffy court also
explicitly recognized the proper limits of its power by
“presum[ing] . . . that the Commonwealth will fulfil its responsibility
with respect to defining the specifics and the appropriate means to
119
provide the constitutionally-required education.” In this case, as in
Kentucky, the court’s presumption proved correct.
A mere three days after the opinion in McDuffy was issued, the
120
legislature passed the Education Reform Act of 1993 (ERA), which
“radically restructured the funding of public education . . . based on
uniform criteria of need, and dramatically increased . . . mandatory
financial assistance to public schools.”121 The ERA also created
objective and performance-based accountability measures for all
122
children, teachers, schools, and districts. Although the education
system in Massachusetts is not perfect and gaps based on wealth
remain between districts, “the elected branches have acted to
transform a dismal and fractured public school system into a unified
system that has yielded . . . ‘impressive results in terms of

114. Id. at 500–02.
115. Id. at 515–16.
116. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
117. Id. at 555.
118. Id. at 554.
119. Id. at 555 n.92.
120. Education Reform Act of 1993, 1993 Mass. Acts 71 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of MASS. ANN. LAWS chs. 10, 15, 29, 60, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 150E, 214 (LexisNexis 2006)).
121. Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring).
122. Id.

05__RALSTON ELDER.DOC

776

12/20/2007 10:12:19 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:755

123
improvement in overall student performance.’” In declining to
continue its oversight of the school reform process, the Supreme
Judicial Court lauded the legislature for upholding its end of the
separation of powers bargain by acting quickly and creating a “steady
trajectory of progress” for the state’s education system.124
In both Kentucky and Massachusetts, the courts issued strong
and specific rulings in their first dispositions of the cases, the state
legislatures responded quickly and assertively by substantially
reforming the education systems, and no further intervention by the
courts was needed to ensure constitutional compliance. In neither
case did the court decide how much money would be spent or any
125
other functional detail of the reformed education system. The
courts were able to enforce their respective state constitutions while
deferring to the separation of powers precisely because the other
branches of government accepted the courts’ rulings and acted.

IV. WHEN THE LAWMAKERS DROP THE BALL
Although the Kentucky and Massachusetts legislatures proved
amenable to change, it may be difficult for a state court to know in
advance what type of legislative reaction it will receive when it is
deciding a constitutional case. If the legislature proves unwilling to
remedy the situation, how should a state court, which need not be
preoccupied with the Article III interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine,126 respond? This Part examines three possibilities by
examining the approaches of Ohio and New Jersey, New York and
North Carolina, and Nevada. Section A looks at the overly
deferential stance of the courts in Ohio and New Jersey as a response
to legislative intransigence and the results for children and their
constitutional rights. In contrast, Section B examines New York’s and
North Carolina’s progress in balancing the separation of powers
between the courts and legislatures and the need to ensure
compliance with constitutional mandates. In both states, key aspects
of this success have included courts retaining jurisdiction over the

123. Id. (quoting Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *486
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2004)).
124. Id. at 1139.
125. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v.
Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993); see also supra note
108.
126. See supra Part I (discussing the separation of powers doctrine).
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cases, being specific and upfront about timelines and expectations,
clearly defining the right at issue, and following through with
enforcement proceedings if the legislatures fail to act. Section C then
examines the unique experience in Nevada where the supreme court
effectively prioritized sections of the state’s constitution to lower the
standard for increasing taxes to assure that educational rights were
upheld.
A. Refusing to Fight Back: Ohio and New Jersey
In 1991, students from rural Perry County, Ohio, filed suit
against the state of Ohio, alleging that the state’s system of funding
schools failed to meet the state constitution’s mandate that the state
establish a “thorough and efficient” system of education.127 The Ohio
Supreme Court first decided the case in 1997 in DeRolph v. State
128
(DeRolph I), calling for a complete overhaul of the state’s school
funding system.129 The General Assembly’s piecemeal reform efforts
were found inadequate when the system was again declared
130
unconstitutional in 2000 (DeRolph II) and then again in 2001
(DeRolph III).131
Throughout this process, the court attempted to keep its distance
from policymaking, but in the 2001 decision, DeRolph III, it declared
that “changes to the [funding] formula are required to make the new
132
133
plan constitutional.” The court went on to list requirements at a
level of specificity that belied the court’s exhortation in the opinion’s
opening paragraphs that designing a plan is “not [its] burden.”134 This
135
plan, however, was vacated a year later in DeRolph IV when the
136
court issued a prompt reversal. Then in 2003, after an election
changed the composition of the court, it issued DeRolph V,137 which
ended the line of cases by declaring that the trial court no longer had

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Obhof, supra note 63, at 83–84 (internal quotations omitted).
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
Id. at 747.
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1020 (Ohio 2000).
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1200–01 (Ohio 2001).
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1200–01.
Id. at 1189.
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002).
Id. at 530.
State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003).
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138
jurisdiction over the remedy. The case is therefore over but the
139
issue remains unresolved.
After six years of the General Assembly’s failing to comply with
the court’s mandates, it is ironic that the court so adamantly defended
its decision in DeRolph IV to give the legislature total authority over
140
solving the problem. In the ten years after the court found Ohio’s
schools constitutionally inadequate, the court did not reverse its
finding, and judicial restraint did not improve the education of the
generation of children who attended these schools during that
period.141
The New Jersey experience—still ongoing in 2007—has involved
a similar string of repetitive decisions lasting over thirty years; and
142
progress, when it has come at all, has come in inches, not miles. The
143
144
ordeal began in 1970 when Robinson v. Cahill was first filed. In
the first New Jersey Supreme Court decision, the court upheld the
trial court’s determination that the state’s funding system was
unconstitutionally inequitable but failed to define the constitutional
mandate of “a thorough and efficient system” of education.145 At the
time, the state provided only 28 percent of education funding—
substantially below the 40 percent that was required by state statute
and was the national average.146 Regarding remedies, the case was
reminiscent of Brown v. Board of Education’s147 “all deliberate speed”

138. Id. at 202.
139. Hignett, supra note 11, at 740.
140. DeRolph V, 789 N.E.2d at 202 (“The duty now lies with the General Assembly to
remedy an educational system that has been found by the majority in DeRolph IV to still be
unconstitutional.”). The court never found the school system constitutional or overturned the
substantive findings of DeRolph I, II, and IV. Id.
141. See Hignett, supra note 11, at 760 (noting Chief Justice Moyer’s frustration in his
DeRolph IV dissent that, without the judicial remedy from DeRolph III, the parties are
“simply . . . in the same position that they were in when this litigation all began”). Moyer was
the court’s staunchest advocate of deference in DeRolph I and II. See id. at 755 (noting that
“Moyer dissented on separation of powers grounds”).
142. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s Experience
Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 618 (2004) (“Over the
course of this tumultuous period . . . the New Jersey Supreme Court was continually called upon
to address school finance deficiencies, but was repeatedly proven powerless in its attempts to
reform urban education.”).
143. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
144. Greif, supra note 142, at 618.
145. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295 (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. at 296.
147. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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148
requirement, vaguely stating that the legislature would need “some
time” to act and inviting parties back for further argument on the
remedy issue.149
There were eventually seven New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions in the Robinson line of cases.150 During the 1970s, the New
Jersey Legislature developed a “pattern of noncompliance” with the
151
court’s rulings. The court responded with tough talk in Robinson
152
IV, noting that the “time has now arrived” for the court to “act,
even . . . to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches
153
of government” because “no alternative remain[ed].” Unfortunately
for New Jersey’s children, this talk was not accompanied by
sufficiently strong action as the court simply repeated its order for a
new funding system, which the legislature enacted and then refused to
fund.154 Only when the high court enforced an injunction closing all
the schools in the state did the legislature appropriate the funding
necessary for the new system, which relieved localities of some of the
financial burden of operating schools.155 But this injunction did not
156
come until Robinson VI.
Nearly two decades later, serious inequities persisted among the
bottom decile of districts, and the Robinson story virtually repeated
157
itself in Abbott v. Burke and its progeny. In these cases the court
became gradually more specific over time due to its “[f]rustrat[ion]
158
with the recalcitrance of the New Jersey Legislature.” Although the
159
order in Abbott V was more specific and demanding than the order

148. Id. at 301.
149. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 298. In Brown, the arguments regarding remedies were
scheduled in the term following the one that decided the segregation issue. Brown, 347 U.S. at
495.
150. Greif, supra note 142, at 620.
151. Id.
152. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
153. Id. at 724.
154. See Sheil, supra note 62, at 629–33 (noting that in Robinson I the Court withheld
consideration of whether it could order equalization of funds if the state failed to act, but that in
Robinson IV a “decidedly less tentative supreme court ordered a redistribution of state funds to
increase aid to poorer school districts as well as equalize tax burdens for support of education
expenditures”).
155. Id. at 634.
156. Id. (citing Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 358 A.2d 457, 459 (1976) (per curiam)).
157. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
158. Greif, supra note 142, at 615.
159. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998)
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160
in Rose, the legislature seemed to have learned from experience
that there was little consequence to violating the court’s orders.161 This
lesson was reinforced in Abbott VI162 when the court refused to
appoint a standing master or issue an injunction to force the state to
stop dragging its heels in implementing the preschool programs
required under Abbott V.163 Although the state did eventually get
around to creating the preschools, five years after the Abbott VI
decision, only 40 percent of preschool classrooms in districts covered
by the Abbott decision were performing at the “good-to-excellent
164
range” or better as mandated by the court. The New Jersey system
improved, but given its slow rate of improvement, many more
generations of children will be undereducated before the problem is
165
solved.
Although the Ohio court simply threw up its hands in frustration,
the New Jersey court did finally get tough, but it took thirty years. In
the time between the original filing in Robinson in 1970 and the
judicial remedy in Abbott VI in 2000, New Jersey schools remained
constitutionally inadequate according to the court. During that time,
166
several million students attended New Jersey public schools and
were thus denied their constitutional right to an adequate education.

160. Abbott V required whole-school reform and full-day kindergarten and half-day
preschool programs for three- and four-year-olds, technology programs, accountability
programs, alternative schools, school-to-work and college-transition programs, rehabilitating
and constructing needed infrastructure, id. at 473–74, whereas Rose specified the standards that
must be met and left the implementation to the legislature, Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
161. See Greif, supra note 142, at 616 (noting that the “political leaders continued to find
wiggle room to thwart the thrust of the court’s orders”).
162. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000).
163. See id. at 95–96 (“We do not see the need for the appointment of a Judge of the
Superior Court as a Standing Master . . . . Education disputes are properly decided in the first
instance by those statutorily entrusted with that responsibility.”).
164. Laura Fasbach, Gains Found in Abbott Preschools, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.),
May 20, 2005, at A3.
165. See Abbott VI, 748 A.2d at 85 (noting that “another generation of children will pay the
price for each year of delay”).
166. See Southern Regional Education Board, Elementary and Secondary School
Enrollment, Enrollment Data-Public (June 2007), available at http://www.sreb.org/DataLibrary/
tables/FB07.xls (reporting annual enrollment of students in New Jersey schools). Dividing the
sum of the annual enrollment during these years by thirty to find the average number of
students enrolled per year and then again by thirteen (the number of grades in public schools)
gives the average number of students per class. Multiplying this figure by the forty-two classes of
students that passed through the New Jersey schools between 1970 and 2000 gives a total of 4.19
million students.
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For those students and for the hundreds of thousands in Ohio who
continue to attend constitutionally inadequate schools, there was no
remedy because the legislatures refused to act, and the courts bowed
in deference.
B. Start Strong and Carry a Big Stick: New York and North Carolina
The courts in New York attempted to prevent much of the backand-forth with the legislature by being upfront about their
expectations. In 1993, the nonprofit Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
representing schoolchildren from New York City, filed suit against
the state, alleging that inadequate funding was denying the children
167
their right to a sound basic education. In its first decision on the
merits in 2003, the Court of Appeals hoped to emulate the Kentucky
experience—and avoid the prolonged litigation experienced in New
Jersey168—by “initially offer[ing] more detailed remedial directions.”169
Like the Kentucky court, the New York court provided the
legislature with a specific definition of the skills students must attain
to fulfill the state’s guarantee of a “sound basic education.”170 The
court attempted to strike the balance in terms of deference by
searching for a remedy that was “ultimately less entangling for the
courts” than overseeing finance reform but “more promising” for the
plaintiffs than simply directing the state to fix the problem.171 The
court settled on largely affirming the trial court’s order and requiring
the state to determine the cost of providing a sound basic education
to the children of New York City and then to provide it.172 The
legislature was also given a strict one-year time limit in which to
173
remedy the financial inadequacies of the system.

167. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., A Sound Basic Education for All Children: The
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, http://www.cfequity.org/ns-nys.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 330 (“[W]e equate[] a sound basic education with ‘the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as
civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.’” (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995)).
171. Id. at 345.
172. Id. at 348.
173. See id. at 349 (“[D]efendants should have until July 30, 2004 to implement the
necessary measures.”).
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In the 2006 round of litigation, the New York courts virtually
bypassed concerns about the separation of powers, and the issue on
appeal became very specific: not whether the Court of Appeals
should order the legislature to appropriate a specific dollar amount to
remedy the problem, but exactly how much the legislature must
spend.174 Although the decision was written in the language of
175
deference to the state’s other branches of government, the court
was not deferring. The legislature failed to meet the deadline set in
the 2003 case and was ordered to spend at least $1.9 billion more per
176
year on the New York City public schools. The court could have
adopted the New Jersey brand of deference and simply ordered the
state legislature to remedy the situation however it saw best, but
instead, after having given the state that chance after the 2003
decision,177 the court left no room for political wrangling. In the wake
of the decision, then Governor-elect Eliot Spitzer continued to
promise more than the minimum, and even the state’s Republican
leaders, who held up the same $1.9 billion proposal in 2004 leading to
the courts’ renewed involvement in the case, said they supported
fulfilling the court’s mandate.178 In April 2007, the legislature
approved the state budget with an increase of $1.76 billion for
education, about half of which went to New York City.179 Although
this was only half the mandated amount, it constituted a significant
victory for the plaintiffs, coming a mere four years after the first high

174. The Referees appointed by the trial court concluded that $5.63 billion per year for the
New York City public schools would be sufficient, whereas Defendants, who ultimately
prevailed in the high court, were seeking a ruling requiring only $1.9 billion per year. Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 55–57 (N.Y. 2006).
175. Id. at 58 (noting in particular that “the Judiciary has a duty ‘to defer to the Legislature
in matters of policymaking, particularly in a matter so vital as education financing . . . . [The
courts] have neither the authority, nor the ability, nor the will, to micromanage education
financing.’” (quoting CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 345)).
176. Id. at 52–53. The $1.9 billion cost estimate was endorsed by a special commission
created by Governor George Pataki to study the issue and was substantially lower than the
Referees’ estimate of $5.63 billion. Id. at 56. The key differences in the numbers were whether
districts spending above the median for all effective districts are financially inefficient; how
much to weight the needs of English language learners, disabled students, and low-income
students; and which cost adjustment method was used to compare different parts of the state. Id.
at 60.
177. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
178. David M. Herszenhorn, List for Schools Seems to Grow More Wishful: Ruling May
Force City to Scale Back Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at B1.
179. Ford Fessenden, Schools are Seeking Higher Taxes Despite Extra Aid from Albany,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, at A1.
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180
court decision declaring the schools inadequate. As of December
2007, however, it is unknown whether they will return to court
seeking more.
A similar situation has played out in North Carolina. In 2004, the
North Carolina Supreme Court declared that students in many low
wealth counties in the state were not receiving their constitutionally
entitled “sound basic education.”181 The ruling came in response to a
suit filed in 1994 by parents and school boards in five rural counties
that claimed the state was not providing adequate aid. As the suit
progressed, six urban districts joined, claiming the state’s funding
formula was inadequate to educate at-risk students and English
182
language learners. In a prior decision denying the state’s motion to
dismiss, the court, also emulating Rose, specifically defined the skills
that composed a sound, basic education.183 In the 2004 decision, while
repeatedly recognizing the separation of powers and the legislative
184
and executive branches’ authority over the funding issue, the court
ultimately remanded the case to the trial court to oversee the
185
implementation rather than ordering it to relinquish jurisdiction.
Judge Howard Manning of the Wake County Superior Court has
been an active manager of the case on remand, which has produced
186
positive results across the state. The next year, Governor Mike
Easley specially asked for and the general assembly appropriated $25
million for a special fund that gives districts extra money for
disadvantaged students.187 In 2006, the reluctant general assembly
stepped up and doubled the fund for disadvantaged students, fully

180. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 2007–2008 Enacted Education Budget
Legislation, http://www.cfequity.org/ns-legislation.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (“With
Governor Spitzer’s leadership, we have turned litigation into law.” (quoting Geri Palast,
Executive Dir., Campaign for Fiscal Equity)).
181. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 396 (N.C. 2004).
182. North Carolina Justice Center, Leandro Lawsuit, www.ncjustice.org/content/index.
php?pid=78 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
183. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
184. Hoke County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 395 (“[W]e . . . recognize our limitations in
providing specific remedies for violations committed by other government branches in . . .
public school education, that is within their primary domain.”).
185. Id. at 397.
186. See Todd Silberman, Schools Want a Spending Plan; Wake Judge Hears Funding
Request, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 8, 2005, at 5B (“No more playing the budget
game . . . . I don’t want to hear it any more.” (quoting Judge Manning)).
187. See id. (“The State Board of Education has requested $25 million for the disadvantaged
student fund—about the same that Easley provided during two special allocations last year.”).
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funded the low wealth equalization fund, and spent a total of $600
million more than it spent in fiscal year 2005 on education
188
statewide. Manning’s management has gone beyond the budget: in
the spring of 2006, he threatened to enjoin seventeen very lowperforming high schools from opening in August if significant changes
in leadership and design were not made.189 By August, sixteen schools
had made the changes and opened on schedule, many with new ninthgrade academies to improve student performance before students
take graduation tests.190
In both New York and North Carolina, the states’ highest courts
spoke repeatedly of deference to the legislature, but they also stated
that such deference comes with the requirement of the legislature
doing its job. In both states, by retaining jurisdiction over the cases
and remanding them to trial level, judges maintained a commitment
to ensuring that the students’ rights are enforced. Furthermore, both
courts were specific and upfront about their expectations. Like
Kentucky, both states precisely defined the scope of the right at issue.
New York additionally set a tight deadline for compliance, and then,
unlike Ohio, moved forward with enforcement proceedings when the
deadline was not met. Although more time is inevitably needed to see
whether these actions were enough to secure students’ rights
substantively, initial evidence is promising.
C. Change the Rules of the Game: Nevada
Nevada has never had an education equality or adequacy case,
but in 2003, the state came to a standoff regarding its education
budget.191 Four provisions of the Nevada Constitution seemed to
conflict:192 the legislature is the only body that can raise revenue or

188. Todd Silberman & Dan Kane, Schools’ Budget Ship Comes In, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 6, 2006, at 1A.
189. Todd Silberman, Manning Likes Progress of Failing Schools, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 19, 2006, at 5B.
190. Id. Ninth-grade academies are an alternative organizational model encompassing
smaller learning communities, intensive tutoring and remediation, and mentoring for students.
191. Nat’l Access Network, Litigation: Nevada, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nv/
lit_nv.php3 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
192. Guinn v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Nev. 2003), overruled
in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 348 (Nev. 2006) (overruling only the
portion of Guinn that declares the procedural provisions of the state constitution must yield to
the substantive ones).
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193
appropriate funds; the state must fund a system of common
194
schools; the state must have a balanced budget;195 and by a 1996
amendment, tax increases must pass the legislature by a two-thirds
196
majority. After a full 120-day legislative session and two special
sessions on the education budget, the legislature was at a deadlock,
having passed an appropriations bill by a simple majority but having
been unable to pass the necessary tax increases by the required
supermajority.197 The Governor subsequently sued the legislature and
asked the court to issue writs of mandamus requiring that the
198
legislature raise the appropriate revenue so the schools could open.
The Nevada Supreme Court went one step further and, in addition to
issuing the writ to the legislature, waived the supermajority
requirement and allowed the tax increases to pass by a simple
majority.199
The court reasoned that although the legislature had complete
control over the budget process, “constitutional construction is purely
200
a province of the judiciary.” The court then proceeded to follow
standard rules of statutory construction, relying on the premise that
201
specific provisions should control over general ones. The court
determined that procedural provisions are more general than
substantive ones because the former apply to all bills under
consideration.202 Under the status quo, the legislature’s adherence to
the procedural supermajority provision was preventing it from
203
actualizing the substantive education funding requirement.
Therefore, the court concluded that the provisions could not be
harmonized and that “the procedure must yield” to the basic,
substantive right.204 As part of its support for this outcome, the court

193. NEV. CONST. arts. 3, 4, § 19.
194. Id. art. 11, § 6.
195. Id. art. 9, § 2.
196. Id. art. 4, § 18, cl. 2.
197. Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1273. In Nevada, the legislature in special sessions may only consider
the agenda the governor puts forward. NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 9. In this case, the education
budget and its accompanying funding mechanism were the only items up for discussion. Guinn,
71 P.3d at 1273.
198. Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1274.
201. Id. at 1274–75.
202. Id. at 1276.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1275.
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cited a Wyoming Supreme Court opinion in that state’s education
adequacy line of cases: “[c]onstitutional provisions imposing an
affirmative mandatory duty upon the legislature are judicially
enforceable in protecting individual rights, such as educational
205
rights.” Two weeks after the court’s decision, the tax bill passed by a
two-thirds majority as one Republican legislator who had previously
voted against the bill changed his mind because he did not want the
courts deciding the appropriate level of taxation.206
In 2006, the Nevada high court held in Nevadans for Nevada v.
207
Beers that the constitution must be read as a whole and the
unambiguous text of the document is not dispensable.208 With regard
to constitutional doctrine, Beers was correctly decided. In July of
2003, however, the court was faced with an essentially
insurmountable textual dilemma, and the tack it chose was essentially
the only one available in which educational rights were recognized in
any meaningful way. In the end, the Nevada court was able to secure
students’ education rights through the proper delegation of powers by
threatening the legislature with a loss of control over the situation.
Even though the tax increase, the largest in the state’s history,209
eventually passed by a two-thirds majority, it is undeniable that the
court’s ruling prompted the reluctant Republican to change his
position.210 Although the Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada211 decision
was extreme, it shows that courts need not be deterred from their
responsibility to enforce the entirety of the state’s constitution.
*

*

*

In Ohio and New Jersey, the courts’ unwillingness to push the
legislatures harder has condemned millions of children to an
education that is less than they deserve based on their state
constitutions. In New York, North Carolina, and Nevada, on the
205. Id. (quoting Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995)).
206. See Ed Vogel, Assemblyman Who Broke Deadlock, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 23, 2003,
at 8A (“[The Republican] did not want to risk a simple majority passage of a tax bill being
challenged in court, so he broke the stalemate.”).
207. Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
208. Id. at 348, 350.
209. Sean Whaley & Jane Ann Morri, Guinn Signs Record Tax Increase, LAS VEGAS REV.J., July 23, 2003, at 1A.
210. Vogel, supra note 206.
211. Guinn v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Nev. 2003), overruled
in part by Nevadans for Nev., 142 P.3d at 348.
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other hand, the courts have all seen fit to push the envelope of the
separation of powers doctrine to protect and meaningfully realize
individual students’ educational rights. These three states serve as
examples of courts executing their duties to protect students’
educational rights in the face of legislatures that are less than willing
to uphold their end of the separation of powers bargain. By issuing
strong first opinions, retaining jurisdiction over the cases, and
showing the seriousness of their commitment to educational rights,
these courts demonstrate the effectiveness of taking advantage of the
flexibility of the separation of powers doctrine at the state level.
CONCLUSION
More than three decades after Rodriguez, nine-year-olds in lowincome communities were still performing three grade levels behind
their more affluent peers.212 Yet educating low-income students is not
impossible; it simply takes more time, more effort, and more
resources than the status quo provides.213 When students in every state
214
have some form of constitutional right to education and the formula
for educating all students is known, the achievement gap can only be
attributed to a failure of will among those who control the resources.
In such an environment, it is precisely the role of the courts to stand
up for students, especially low-income students who are largely
voiceless. Yet, in too many cases, the courts have restrained
themselves out of an unnecessary devotion to a federal separation of
powers doctrine developed for Article III courts. State courts are

212. Teach For America, Our Nation’s Greatest Injustice, http://www.teachforamerica.org/
mission/index.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
213. See Knowledge Is Power Program, KIPP in Action: Student Achievement,
http://www.kipp.org/01/schoolachievement.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) (explaining that
KIPP charter schools, located in the poorest neighborhoods, routinely outperform not only their
neighborhood schools but entire school districts). A key part of the KIPP program is that
students attend school for 60 percent longer. Knowledge Is Power Program, About KIPP: What
is a KIPP School?, http://www.kipp.org/01/whatisakippschool.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
Making at-risk students succeed likely also takes more resources than doing the same for nonat-risk students. See Paul Tough, What It Takes to Make a Student, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 26,
2006, at 44, 47–48 (explaining that children from low-income homes need more school resources
to succeed because they begin school substantially behind their higher-income counterparts).
For example, by the time children are three, those with professional parents had vocabularies
more than twice as large as children whose parents were on welfare. Id. at 47; see generally
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6 (detailing various research-based proposals for improving education
of at-risk students, all of which require additional resources).
214. See Hubsch, supra note 3, at 1343–48.
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substantively and significantly different from federal courts in that
they enforce state constitutional rights that are frequently positive in
nature, they have broad and inherent powers, they almost universally
depend on electoral or legislative review, and they are institutionally
competent vis-à-vis state legislatures. Because of these differences,
state courts should embrace their own state vision of what the
separation of powers requires, and they should not hesitate to do
their part in upholding students’ educational rights. As courts in these
cases embark on the challenge of enforcing students’ rights, they
should do so with deference to and trust in the coequal branches of
government, but they should also remain vigilant for evidence that
“[their] trust was misplaced” and that a more active remedy has
215
become necessary.
Although it is unlikely that the courts alone will ever be able to
216
solve the problems of public education, they should not eschew
their proper role in the process. In the meantime, citizens of every
state should join Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of
Appeals in being “hopeful” that their policymakers “will continue to
strive to make the schools not merely adequate, but excellent.”217

215. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 62 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. See Greif, supra note 142, at 656 (“New Jersey’s experience suggests that judicial
opinions alone are insufficient to sustain substantial educational reform.”).
217. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 67 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

